

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 EA-11 OIC-04 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 SCI-06 SAJ-01 AEC-11

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FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4650

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 6225

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: ITALIAN NPT RATIFICATION

REF: COPENHAGEN 892

1. DCM RAISED WITH POLITICAL DIRECTOR GENERAL DUCCI MAY 6 THE QUESTION OF ITALIAN RATIFICATION OF NPT. DUCCI SAID HE HAD RECEIVED ORTONA'S REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE BUT HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THE CONCERN BY THE UNITED STATES FOR ITALIAN RATIFICATION. HE SAID HE HAD IN FACT NEVER HEARD OF ANY POSSIBLE LEGAL COMPLICATIONS FOR EURATOM IF ALL MEMBERS HAD NOT RATIFIED NPT. IN FACT, THE LEGAL OPINION OF THE ITALIAN LAWYERS INDICATED IF ITALY RATIFIED THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT THERE WAS NO NEED TO PROCEED WITH
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NPT RATIFICATION AT THIS TIME BECAUSE FLOW OF FISSIONABLE

MATERIAL WOULD CONTINUE.

2. DUCCI SAID THAT THE FARNESINA HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO MOVE THE NPT RATIFICATION MEASURES THROUGH THE PARLIAMENT FOR FEAR OF OPPOSITION DEVELOPING. WHEN PRESSED, HE ADMITTED THAT ITALY OF COURSE HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT PROFESSED TO BE CONCERNED THAT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF "WHAT HAPPENS TO ITALY IF QADHAFI GETS NUCLEAR WEAPONS". IT WAS SUGGESTED TO DUCCI THAT IF QADHAFI WOULD GET NUCLEAR WEAPONS THE WORLD COMMUNITY WOULD BE FORCED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM AND NOT THE ITALIANS ALONE.

3. FURTHER ON NPT, WE HAVE LEARNED FROM CANADIAN EMBASSY OF RECENT CONVERSATION WHICH CANADIAN AMBASSADOR HAD WITH DUCCI ON SUBJECT. ACCORDING CANADIAN COUNSELOR, OTTAWA HAD INSTRUCTED EMBASSY TO RAISE THE MATTER IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT BID BY ENI TO BUY CANADIAN URANIUM. DUCCI REPORTEDLY TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT GOI HAD NO INTENTION TO SEEK EARLY RATIFICATION OF NPT. ITALY WAS UNDER NO PRESSURE TO DO SO AND WISHED TO SEE HOW CSCE AND MBFR TURNED OUT BEFORE TAKING THIS STEP. DUCCI ALSO USED FAMILIAR ARGUMENT THAT CERTAIN IMPORTANT MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES HAD NOT RATIFIED. FINALLY, DUCCI ADDED, ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WANTS TO SEE RESULTS OF NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE BEFORE MOVING AHEAD TO RATIFY TREATY WHICH WILL CONFIRM ITALIAN STATUS OF SECOND-CLASS POWER.

4. CANADIAN COUNSELOR SAID THAT LATER HE HAD CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN OFFICE DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR WHO, IN CONTRAST TO DUCCI, TOOK STANDARD LINE THAT GOI SAW NPT RATIFICATION AS STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS WHICH FOR PARLIAMENTARY REASONS SHOULD FOLLOW SAFEGUARDS RATIFICATION. RESPONDING TO COUNSELOR'S QUERY WHETHER BOTH DOCUMENTS COULD BE RATIFIED BY END OF YEAR, OFFICE DIRECTOR SAID THAT THIS WAS REASONABLE ESTIMATE. AT SAME TIME, OFFICE DIRECTOR MADE CONTRADICTIONARY ALLUSION TO FACT THAT IT WOULD BE IN GOI INTEREST TO DELAY RATIFICATION PENDING OUTCOME OF NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE.

5. COMMENT. DUCCI DID NOT RPT NOT HAVE TELLING ARGUMENTS FOR NON-RATIFICATION EITHER IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM OR CANADIAN AMBASSADOR. WE SUSPECT PRINCIPAL REASON UNDERLYING ITALIAN PRO-CONFIDENTIAL

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CRASTINATION, AND SHIFTING OF GROUND OF GOI ARGUMENTS EXPLAINING DELAYS, IS SIMPLY FACT THAT ITALIANS TRADITIONALLY FEEL GREAT DISCOMFORT WHEN CLASSED WITH "HAVE NOTS." CLASSIC GOI APPROACH IS TO STRIVE TO BE THE LEAST OF THE "BIGS" RATHER THAN A LEADER IN THE MINOR LEAGUES. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD SPELL OUT FOR DUCCI IN FRANK TERMS THE DIFFICULTY WE WILL HAVE IN VIEW OF OUR NPT OBLIGATIONS IN CONTINUING TO COOPERATE WITH EC COUNTRIES RE NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD INFORM DUCCI OF EFFORTS WE ARE
MAKING TO GET SPAIN, EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO MOVE AHEAD ON NPT. VOLPE

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